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Abstract
Bertrand and the Cournot model are one of the most used model for modeling competition
between companies. This paper presents a work-in-progress that studies the application of the
recently developed Bertrand Network model by using it in a reverse manner: first it is considered
that firms are competing in equilibrium, then, after analyzing how companies are choosing
prices, it is calculated which distribution of buyers would lead to that equilibrium. An unreal
example is presented to help to understand the model. Furthermore, a formula is suggested to
expand the networked model to allow a mix of duopolies and oligopolies.
Keywords: nash equilibrium; bertrand network; market competition; expanded bertrand
network; market expansion

1. INTRODUCTION
In the last years there have been researches to expand the classic Cournot and Bertrand market model
to one version that considers a network competition, where firms can compete over different markets
against different firms at the same time (Bose S. et al 2014; Motalleb et al 2017; Abolhassani et al,
2014). Recent models expanded the idea of a single oligopoly model, where multiple firms compete
for one market share (Bimpikis et al, 2014), since nowadays companies are even able to compete in
multiple markets and react in real-time due to online analysis tools (Babaioff, et al, 2014).
Antoine Augustin Cournot and Joseph Bertrand have introduced the first model for studying the
duopoly competition where. In the first one, firms can only choose quantity of a good to supply to
the market (leaving the price to be determined by an auctioneer (Scheinkman & A., 1983)), while in
the second one, firms can choose price as a strategy (Abolhassani et al, 2014).
Both tools have been used for investigating competitive markets, while Bertrand model are more
suitable for price competition (Babaioff et al, 2014; Kasbekar & Sarkar, 2012). Cournot competition
is being used for modeling markets like electricity, where vendors decide for quantities rather than
prices (Abolhassani et al, 2014), e.g., (Barquin & Vazquez, 2008; Jing-Yuan & Smeers, 1999; Yao,
Oren, & Adler, 2004). The Bertrand Network model has been proposed by Guzmán (2011) and it
has been expanded in other works (Babaioﬀ et al, 2013; Babaioff et al, 2014; Babaioff et al, 2016).
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All of them being an expansion of the classic model that has been widely used in pricing competition
(Babaioff et al, 2014).
In the existing Cournot Network Competition (Bimpikis et al, 2014), an arbitrary number of firms
can compete in the same market. This model allows to predict the reaction of other firms in case of
one vendor decides to join one existing market share, as well as predict whether it is profitable for
two firms to merge or not.
The main field of study of the authors is to offer a tool to analyze the chance of success to one vendor
if he tries to expand to another market, in special, expanding to a market in another country (an
international expansion). In the study, firms are competing using prices in several markets. The
authors are currently working in another improvement for the Bertrand Networked Model (Babaioﬀ
et al, 2013), which contains several profs that asserts the existence of a Nash Equilibrium in any
graph but has a limitation: only two firms can compete against each other in the same shared market.
In the existing model, all buyers in each market share buy from the firm that asked for the lowest
price. Firms cannot price discriminate, which means that each of them will ask for the same price
for both shared markets that they are participating in and the captive market (if he has one). It is
assumed that all companies sell a homogeneous good, so buyers are only interested in the lowest
price (these properties have been kept).
The goal is to allow more firms to compete for one market. Since the main field of study is to evaluate
whether is it profitable for a firm to join an existing market or not, it is required to allow at least 3
vendors to compete at the same market share (the firm that wants to expand, as well as two others
that were already competing), which is not possible in the existing model. The attempt to expand the
existing model uses the same basic structure: a hypergraph where each node represents firms, and
hyperedges that represents shared markets. In addition, it is currently being worked on a practical
application of the Bertrand Network model for this study, which is believed to be from little to no
work that used the model that has inspired this work, in contrast to the Cournot Network model.,
e.g., (Bose S et al, 2014; Cai et al, 2017; Motalleb et al, 2017).
This paper presents one of the possible applications of the existing model to verify why companies
are pricing in one specific way. Furthermore, it is shown one more evidence that, for each oligopoly
market in the Expanded Bertrand Network, each vendor does not do better than ignoring the existing
of such market share since the competition will be too aggressive between the two small vendors, as
has already been proved by Guzmán (2011).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 shows the Bertrand Network model,
to understand its structure. Since there is a lack of a practical usage of the Bertrand Network in a
real case, Section 3 presents how to apply the existing model in a real scenario. The Section 4 shows

18.ª Conferência da Associação Portuguesa de Sistemas de Informação (CAPSI’2018)

2

Ferreira & Pereira / A demonstration of an application of the Bertrand Network

an expanded formula from the existing model, that is, Equation (7), as well as an illustrative example
to better understand the formula, leaving the remaining section for discussion of the future work.

2. EXISTING MODEL
This warm-up example will be useful to understand the structure of the Bertrand Network. Consider
the following competition among three vendors: the firm 𝑓1 sells devices to users that are interested
in high-performance and has a captive market α1 = 20 that represents the set of buyers that will buy
from the firm f1 no matter the price, as long it is not higher than 1 (loyal buyers). The firm f2 , on the
other hand, sells devices to buyers that are interested in both high and low performance devices
(participating in two different markets). Finally, the firm f3 are only interested to sell to buyers that
are interested in low-performance devices. After this, buyers were categorized into three different
markets.
The firm f1 competes for the market β1,2 = 150 against f2 , while the firm f3 competes for the market
β2,3 = 185 against f2 . Neither f2 nor f3 has a set of loyal buyers, therefore, α2 = α3 = 0.

Figure 1 – Example of competition. Nodes represent firms, each hyperedge represents a market share.
Captive markets are represented with a weight within the node, in which an empty node represents a captive
market of size zero. Thick lines represent the pricing strategy of each firm that falls within their support, as a
subset of [0,1]. The black circle represents an atom at 1. It is said that when a firm has an atom at 1, the firm
chooses the price of 1 with a positive probability.

In the given example, f1 faces a tradeoff between extracting the maximum surplus from its captive
market by asking for the monopolized price of 1 and lowering the price to increase the likelihood of
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winning market share β1,2 . On the other hand, f2 must decide for a price that, at the same time, will
extract the maximum surplus from both shared markets.
Figure. 1 shows the competition network and the equilibrium sketch for the network. An equilibrium
sketch is defined as a specification of the finitely bounded pricing range (support) for every seller i
and the set of sellers that has an atom at 1. (Babaioﬀ et al, 2013) has formally defined it in Definition
5.1 and any support can be set, as well as any set of sellers with an atom at 1 can be chosen, but the
results from the equilibrium sketch must satisfy the properties in Definition 5.2.
From the results in Babaioﬀ et al (2013, pp. 7-8), the unique Nash Equilibrium (N.E.) for this
topology is that each company must mix its pricing strategy by following its support (see Figure 1)
and randomize by following its Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF). To each company be
indifferent in choosing any price that falls within its support, the utility level for each vendor must
be the same by pricing at x ∈ [t m , t n ] (where 0 < t m ≤ t n ≤ 1 are the boundary points of its
support, for a network that has at least one firm with an nonzero captive market). Formally, the
following must hold:
𝑢1 (𝑡1 ) = 𝑢1 (𝑡2 ) = 𝑢1 (𝑥) ∀𝑥 ∈ [𝑡2 , 𝑡1 ]
𝑢2 (𝑡1 ) = 𝑢2 (𝑡2 ) = 𝑢2 (𝑡3 ) = 𝑢2 (𝑥) ∀𝑥 ∈ [𝑡3 , 𝑡1 ]

(1)

𝑢3 (𝑡2 ) = 𝑢3 (𝑡3 ) = 𝑢3 (𝑥) ∀𝑥 ∈ [𝑡3 , 𝑡2 ]
By working with the equalities above, it is possible to find the CDF function that represents the
probability of each firm to choose the price of at least x. The utility level of each firm is defined by
Babaioﬀ et al (2013) as follows:

ui (x, F−i ) = ui (x) = x (αi + ∑ βi,j Fj (x))

(2)

j∈N(i)

Where N(i) is a set of neighbors of i, βi,j is the weight of the edge that connects i and j, αi is the size
of the captive market of i and Fj (x) represents the inverse CDF function (CDF for short), the mixed
pricing strategy for the firm j. The inverse CDF is a nonincreasing linear function in x −1 which can
be explicitly found for every x ∈ [0,1] by working with equalities in (1). For a detailed description
of how to find the explicit CDF function for every firm i (for the same graph), see Babaioﬀ et al
(2013, pp. 7-8).
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Figure 2 – Optimal Inverse Cumulative distribution function for each firm after working with the equalities
defined in Equation (1). This represents the expected behavior for each firm. For instance, Firm 1 has the
chance of 100% of choosing the price of 0.2 for higher, which means that it is not expected to see Firm 1
asking for the price lower than 0.2.

For this example, by working with the equalities in (1), it has been found that t 1 = 1, t 2 =
0.2294520548, and t 3 = 0.102739726. Those values are the optimal pricing ranges for each firm
i that allows mixing where none of the firms can deviate to another CDF function (pricing strategy)
or to another pricing ranges to get a better payoff. In the Figure. 3, it is possible to see that 𝑓2 is more
likely to succeed in this scenario by having the highest utility level.

Figure 3 – Utility level for each company. Note that between the pricing range that fall within the support of
each firm, the utility level is the same.
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3. APPLYING THE MODEL IN A REVERSE MANNER
To verify if it is profitable for a firm to join an existing market, it is needed to apply this model to
one existing network and then, simulate an entrance from some firm (see Fig. 5 for an illustrative
example). Comparing the results will show information such as:


Changes in pricing decision of each firm (reaction);



Expected profit of each firm before and after the entrance of a firm in the network.

It is important to comprehend how buyers are distributed over market shares. This allows an analyst
to understand the potential changes of each market in the network by repeating the process over
time, tracking what is happening to the markets. If the result from the model shows that the number
of buyers in a market has fallen, it may suggest that the market is in decline.
While the existing Bertrand Network model allows to go from the size of markets to the optimal
ranging prices for each company, it is suggested to do the opposite in this study. If the distribution
of buyers is not known, it will not be possible to repeat the calculations like the one briefly shown
in the Section 2. The remainder of this section shows how to use the model to discover proportion
of buyers from each market.
First, one must model the competition network by checking who is competing against whom and in
which market. Then, figure out the equilibrium sketch of the built network because it is not known
any algorithm that can give the equilibrium of any given network, although the equilibrium sketch
is known for some graph structures (Babaioﬀ et al, 2013). Also, a data set of prices is needed, so an
information of prices over time is required to known how sellers are pricing.
It is assumed that the companies are playing the price competition game rationally, i.e., are indeed
following their best CDF to choose prices within the optimal pricing range.
Recalling the Section 2, the same graph structure is modeled, but now the market sizes are assumed
to be unknow and it will be shown that it is possible to get similar results from the original example
by only knowing the prices that each firm was choosing.
3.1.

Collecting Prices

Consider that prices were collected from day d1 to dn and let Pi,k,j be the j-th price from the k-th day
of the i-th firm. Let Pi be the non-decreasing sorted set of prices from the i-th firm. Finally, let P be
the union of every Pi .
As the existing model use prices in [0,1], let the collected prices be mapped from [0, M] to [0,1],
where M is the highest price collected. Formally, let f: P → [0,1].
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Recalling the graph presented in the Section 2, the equilibrium sketch defines that the seller 𝑓1 is
pricing in [𝑡2 , 𝑡1 ], 𝑓2 in [𝑡3 , 𝑡1 ] and 𝑓3 in [𝑡3 , 𝑡2 ]. Therefore, 𝑡1 must be the greatest value in 𝑃, 𝑡3 the
minimum and let 𝑡2 be the minimum value of f1 .
Let Ci (x) be the number of elements in Pi that are lesser than x. To calculate the probability of
randomly choosing the value of x or higher from the data set, let Fi (x) =
3.2.

|Pi | − Ci (x)
|Pi |

.

Assumptions

Suppose that an analyst has collected a data set that shows the following information:


t 1 = 1 as it would be in any equilibrium (Babaioﬀ et al, 2013);



f1 chooses the price of 1 with positive probability (has an atom at 1). Consider that after
analyzing the data set, it has been found that the probability for f1 to choose the price of t 1
or higher is F1 (t 1 ) = 0,23, like in the original example (see Figure. 2);



With similar reasoning, F2 (t 2 ) = 0,45;



F1 (x) = F2 (x) = F3 (𝑥) = 1 ∀x ≤ t 3 since every firm are choosing prices higher than t 3;



F2 (t 1 ) = F3 (t 2 ) = 0 by claiming the results from Babaioﬀ et al (2013, p. 9), Lemma 4.2
that states: “Fix any valid tie breaking rule. In any network and any equilibrium, no two
sellers who share a market both have an atom at the same positive price”;



F3 (x) = 0 ∀x ≥ t 2 since t 2 is the higher price for f3 .

Note that the CDF for each company has been defined at the boundary points in their support, which
would be possible by observing a data set.
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3.3.

Calculating the market share from prices and CDFs

Figure 4 – Hypergraph in which only the prices are known. Note the question marks, indicating that the
market sizes are unknown.

Now, the calculation must be started by defining the following equalities that in equilibrium must
be satisfied (see Equation (1)).
u1 (t 1 ) = u1 (t 2 )
t 1 ∗ α1 = t 2 ∗ (α1 + β1,2 ∗ F2 (t 2 ))
𝑡2
𝛼1
=
𝑡1 𝛼1 + 𝛽1,2 ∗ 𝐹2 (𝑡2 )

(3)

u2 (t 1 ) = u2 (t 2 )
t 1 (α2 + β1,2 ∗ F1 (t 1 )) = t 2 (α2 + β1,2 )
t 2 α2 + β1,2 ∗ F1 (t 1 )
=
t1
α2 + β1,2

(4)

u2 (t 2 ) = u2 (t 3 )
t 2 ∗ (α2 + β1,2 ) = t 3 ∗ (α2 + β1,2 + β2,3 )
t3
α2 + β1,2
=
t 2 α2 + β1,2 + β2,3
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u3 (t 2 ) = u3 (t 3 )
t 2 ∗ (α3 + β2,3 ∗ F2 (t 2 )) = t 3 ∗ (α3 + β2,3 )
t 3 α3 + β2,3 ∗ F2 (t 2 )
=
t2
α3 + β2,3

(6)

To be able to calculate the proportion of each market, the following equalities will be used:
𝛼1 = 𝑎 ∗ 𝛽1,2
𝛼2 = 𝑏 ∗ 𝛽1,2
𝛼3 = 𝑐 ∗ 𝛽1,2
𝛽2,3 = 𝑘 ∗ 𝛽1,2
This will simplify the calculations since now it will be possible to find the ratio of each market over
β1,2 (chosen by convenience, note that every shared market will be greater than 0, otherwise that
market share would not exist). From Equation (3):
t2 =

a ∗ β1,2
a ∗ β1,2 + β1,2 ∗ F2 (t 2 )
t2 =

a
a + F2 (t 2 )

a = t 2 ∗ (a + F2 (t 2 ))
a − t 2 ∗ a = t 2 ∗ F2 (t 2 )
a=

t 2 ∗ F2 (t 2 )
1 − t2

Since ‘a’ only uses constant values, from now on ‘a’ can be treated as a constant value. Proceeding
with (4):
t2 =

b ∗ β1,2 + β1,2 ∗ F1 (t 1 )
b ∗ β1,2 + β1,2
t2 =

b + F1 (t 1 )
b+1

t 2 ∗ b + t 2 − b = F1 (t 1 )
b ∗ (t 2 − 1) + t 2 = F1 (t 1 )
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b=

F1 (t 1 ) − t 2
t2 − 1

From Equation (5):
t2
β2,3
= 1+
t3
α2 + β1,2
t2
k
=1+
t3
b+1
k=(

t2
− 1) ∗ (b + 1)
t3

Finally, from Equation (6):
t 3 c + k ∗ F2 (t 2 )
=
t2
c+k
t3
t3
∗ c + ∗ k − c = k ∗ F2 (t 2 )
t2
t2
c∗(

t3
t3
− 1) = k ∗ (F2 (t 2 ) − )
t2
t2
F2 (t 2 ) −
c=k∗

t3
t2 − 1

t3
t2

This concludes the calculation and now it is possible to find the buyer distribution over the network
that would lead to the same pricing range and CDF in the original example by just setting a value
for β1,2 . Note that there are many possible values for β1,2 , and each of them will lead to different
utility levels. By choosing β1,2 = 150, let see the value of the other markets that would be found by
using the results that was calculated:
α1 = 20.16233766
α2 = 0
α3 = 0.0455
β2,3 = 195
Note that those results are very close to the first example in Section 2. By calculating every market
size as a ratio over one of them (in this case every market size was being calculated over β1,2 ) it is
possible verify, for T being the total of buyers that will be distributed over the structure:
α1 + α2 + α3 + β1,2 + β2,3 = T
a ∗ β1,2 + b ∗ β1,2 + c ∗ β1,2 + k ∗ β1,2 = T
18.ª Conferência da Associação Portuguesa de Sistemas de Informação (CAPSI’2018)
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β1,2 =

T
a+b+c+k

Similar reasoning can be applied for other networks. It is worth noting that the price and CDF values
have been rounded at the beginning of this section, thus the approximated results for each market
share.

4. EXPANDED BERTRAND NETWORK
To show what is willing to achieve, consider the following Figure.

Figure 5 – Two connected components of the hypergraph in (a) representing two different market networks
and (b) an expansion attempt of the firm 𝑓4 to join the market share 𝑀1.

First, it is stated that any market which is being shared for more than two firms are called oligopoly
shared market. The meaning of 𝑁(i) has changed to be the set of shared markets that are being shared
to exactly 2 vendors. Now the Equation (2) is expanded to one form that considers the mix of
duopolies and oligopolies.
:

𝑢𝑖 (𝑥) = 𝑥 ∗ (𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘 ∗ 𝜎−𝑖,𝑘 (𝑥) + ∑ 𝛽𝑖,𝑗 ∗ 𝐹𝑗 (𝑥))
𝑘∈𝑁 𝑜(𝑖)

(7)

𝑗∈𝑁(𝑖)

Where No (i) is the set of the neighboring oligopoly shared markets of i, βk is the size of the
oligopoly shared market k and 𝜎−𝑖,𝑘 (𝑥) represents some combination of the CDFs of all vendors
that are participating in the oligopoly shared market k excluding the firm i, as a subset of [0,1].
Essentially 𝜎−𝑖,𝑘 (𝑥) tries to represent the combination of the pricing strategy of all competitors of i
in the oligopoly k.
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That said, the attempt to define the aggregated function of CDFs for oligopoly markets is shown
below. To let the utility function be linear (like in the original model), let the aggregated function be
the average sum of all the CDFs. Consider any oligopoly k with n firms and let H(k, y) be a hash
function that returns the index of the y-th firm in that oligopoly k, for 1 ≤ y ≤ n:
𝜎−𝑖,𝑘 (𝑥) =

∑ny=1 FH(y) (x) − 𝐹𝐻(𝑖) (𝑥)
𝑛−1

For the sake of simplicity, k has been omitted from H(k, y). The belief that, in any oligopoly with at
least 2 firms that has a captive market, Lemma 4.2 from Babaioﬀ et al (2013, p. 9) does not apply is
shown below.
Conjecture 1. Fix any network composed by one oligopoly shared market with at least 2 firms that
has a positive captive market. There exist more than one firm that does choose 1 with positive
probability.
Assume that Lemma 4.2 does apply. Sort the firms and label them from 1 to n such as α1 ≥ α2 >
α3 … ≥ αn ≥ 0. Then, if f1 has an atom at 1, the following holds:
σ−1 (1) = 0
Then:
σ−1 (1) =

∑nj=2 Fj (1)
n−1

n

∑ Fj (1) = 0

(8)

j=2

Which is true since none of the firms has an atom at 1. Therefore, for every 1 < i ≤ n:
σ−i (1) =

𝐹1 (1) + ∑nj=2 Fj (1) − 𝐹𝑖 (1)
n−1
σ−i (1) =

𝐹1 (1)
n−1

Thus, For every 1 < i ≤ n:
ui (1) = αi + β ∗ σ−i (1) ⇒ ui (1) = αi + β ∗

𝐹1 (1)
n−1

For the firm n there exist a minimum price t 2 that allows mixing, thus the following must hold:
un (1) = un (t 2 )
αn + β ∗

𝐹1 (1)
𝐹1 (𝑡2 )
= t 2 ∗ (αn + β ∗
)
n−1
n−1
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αn + β ∗

𝐹1 (1)
1
= t 2 ∗ (αn + β ∗
)
n−1
n−1
𝐹1 (1)
n−1
t2 =
1
αn + β ∗ n − 1
αn + β ∗

Every firm that will mix must be mixing at the same interval [t 2 , 1], so none of them can deviate
and ask for a price that will allow him to win the shared market with probability one (Babaioﬀ et al,
2013; Guzmán, 2011).
𝐹1 (1)
n−1
t2 =
1
αi + β ∗ n − 1
αi + β ∗

𝐹 (1)
𝐹 (1)
αn + β ∗ n1− 1
αi + β ∗ n1− 1
= t2 =
1
1
αn + β ∗ n − 1
αi + β ∗ n − 1
This is only possible if 𝑎𝑛 = 𝑎𝑖 for every 𝑖, contradicting the assumption that each firm may have
different sizes of captive markets. This suggests that another firm might be choosing the price of 1
(which would lead to σ−i (1) > 0 for another i > 1), or some firm is choosing the price of 1 with
negative probability, from the equality in Equation (8).
∎
This concludes the belief that Lemma 4.2 must be reworked, in addition to another prof by Guzmán
(2011) that asserted that the duopoly model is the solution of the oligopoly model, but with a
different aggregated function.

5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper has presented one way to use the model for guessing the distribution of buyers over one
competition network. As stated before, the information that can be gather from the proposed attempt
to show how this model is very important and can be useful in analyzing the attempt of one company
to join in another market.
It is now needed to apply this to a real case, detailing how it would be possible to identify the CDF
for each firm at every boundary point of firms support. It is also needed to provide one formal prof
for the Conjecture 1 (if true).
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